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Abstract: If the anatomy, physiology and behaviour of a species differ substantially from our 
own, as in the case of the octopus, can we infer that the species is unconscious? In the daily 
clinical care of patients with disorders of consciousness we face many similar challenges: our 
current approach with these patients - a combination of behavioural and brain imaging-based 
assessments - might also be a viable route to investigating octopus consciousness. 
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Mather (2019) examines the broad spectrum of behaviours and presumed cognitive abilities 
of octopuses and wonders whether a mind (i.e., consciousness) can be inferred from some of 
their capacities. Answering this question calls for operationalizing consciousness in this 
species: the properties of consciousness need to be identified and the corresponding criteria 
developed. There is not yet scientific agreement on a definition of consciousness and thus on 
its properties, let alone criteria. Several criteria have been proposed (e.g., Seth, 2009). All 
these criteria, however, have been developed anthropocentrically, starting from observations 
of consciousness in our own species through subjective reports and comparing the resulting 
data with those recorded in healthy human animals.  
In trying to apply these criteria far from the human context in which they were 
developed, various obstacles arise: for example, if we cannot find a functional equivalent of 
the thalamocortical system in brain organizations different from our own, how can we 






interpret their structural and functional substrates? More generally, if the anatomy, 
physiology, and behaviour of a species are substantially different from ours, can we conclude 
that that species is unconscious (cf. Key, 2016, and accompanying commentary)?  
Many of these challenges are similar to those we face every day in the care of patients 
with disorders of consciousness (DOC) after severe brain damage. The relatives of these 
patients usually come to our clinic to learn about the state of consciousness of their loved 
ones. The diagnosis and prognosis we provide has major repercussions, as it determines 
treatment choices, pain management and potential end-of-life decisions. Knowing the level 
of consciousness of patients -- or of any sentient organism -- shapes our behaviour toward 
them. We are ethically called upon to test and evaluate humans’ state of consciousness –and 
ethical questions also arise with the octopus.  
Currently, in our daily practice with DOC patients, we use a combination of diagnostic 
approaches, bottom-up (behaviour-based assessment) and top-down (brain imaging-based 
assessment). We examine diverse cognitive and noncognitive behaviours and residual brain 
activity, combining a variety of analyses and methods (Gosseries et al. 2014). Although this 
approach provides us with insight into the potential experiences and capabilities of DOC 
patients, we still lack a baseline against which to evaluate these patients’ data, particularly 
for the top-down approach. For example, in interpreting brain imaging data in patients we 
use the healthy population as the standard. Yet, the brain of DOC patients may reorganise 
after injury through brain plasticity (Mogensen, 2011). This altered reorganization may mean 
that there is no longer direct standard against which patient data can be compared.  
The same applies to the octopus and its decentralised nervous system which, despite 
its organisation being so different from that of other animals, nevertheless seems suitable for 
supporting remarkable cognitive capacities. These considerations invite us to consider the 
possibility that consciousness comes not only in different quantities but also in different 
“qualities”: as Godfrey-Smith (2016) points out, evolution may “build minds twice over”. That 
is, one and the same function (consciousness) may take different forms, depending on 
different environmental and social pressures. 
The combination of top-down and bottom-up assessment that we currently use with 
DOC patients may also be relevant to investigating the octopus mind. Although applying brain 
imaging methods to octopuses is unquestionably difficult, some researchers have already 
begun to take up the challenge (Jiang, 2015). If we could implement reliable brain imaging in 
octopuses, some of the paradigms we currently use with DOC patients could be tested in this 
cephalopod species. For example, if we could carry out consistent ERP studies (Annen et al. 
2020)in octopuses, we could monitor their responses to a test we use daily with our patients 
to diagnose their level of consciousness: the local/global auditory evoked potential paradigm 
(Bekinschtein, 2009). In this “oddball” paradigm, two levels of regularities are established, 
one at a local (within-trial) level and one at a global (across-trial) level.  It is assumed that 
specific EEG responses to disruptions of global regularities require active maintenance of 
perceptual representations over time, indicating conscious processing, whereas responses to 
disruptions of local regularities indicate automatic (unconscious) processing. To determine 






whether an octopus could detect a global irregularity would draw us into its cognition or 
perhaps its consciousness1.  
Such top-down measures, integrated with other behavioural tests -- carefully 
designed to test complex cognition and not cognitive shortcuts, as Schnell & Vallortigara 
(2019) point out – may help guide our interactions with nonverbal organisms and reduce 
uncertainties about their (potential) cognition. In view of the current uncertainties regarding 
behavioural and neurophysiological correlates of consciousness, we should remain cautious 
in our inferences. Answering the question "What is it like to be an octopus?”, or “what is it 




Annen, J., Laureys, S., & Gosseries, O. (2020). Brain-computer interfaces for consciousness 
assessment and communication in severely brain-injured patients. In Handbook of 
Clinical Neurology (Vol. 168, pp. 137-152). Elsevier. 
Bekinschtein, TA., Dehaene, S., Rohaut, B., Tadel, F., Cohen, L., Naccache, L. (2009) Neural 
signature of the conscious processing of auditory regularities. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences (PNAS). 3;106(5): 1672-7.  
Godfrey-Smith, P. (2016) Other Minds: The Octopus, the Sea, and the Deep Origins of 
Consciousness. William Collins. 
Godfrey-Smith, P. (2019) Octopus experience. Animal Sentience 26(18) 
Gosseries, O., Di, H., Laureys, S., Boly, M. (2014) Measuring consciousness in severely 
damaged brains. Annual Review of Neuroscience. 37: 457-78. 
Jiang, X., Lu, H., Shigeno, S., Tan, LH., Yang, Y., Ragsdale, CW., Gao, JH. (2014) Octopus visual 
system: a functional MRI model for detecting neuronal electric currents without a 
blood-oxygen-level-dependent confound. Magnetic Resonance in Medicine. 72(5): 
1311-9.  
Key, Brian (2016) Why fish do not feel pain. Animal Sentience 3(1)  
Mather, J. (2019) What is in an octopus's mind? Animal Sentience 26(1). 
Mogensen, J. (2011) Reorganization of the injured brain: implications for studies of the 
neural substrate of cognition. Frontiers in Psychology. 2:7.  
Schnell, A. and Vallortigara, G. (2019) ‘Mind’ is an ill-defined concept: Considerations for 
future cephalopod research. Animal Sentience 26(16). 
Seth, Anil (2009) Explanatory Correlates of Consciousness: Theoretical and Computational 
Challenges. Cognitive Computation. 1: 50–63. 
 
 
1 Although the link between active information maintenance and consciousness is still debated. 
